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MEASURING DAMAGES IN SURVIVAL
ACTIONS FOR TORTIOUS DEATH
Michael M. Martin*
Survival statutes have been adopted to avoid the effect of common

law rules preventing claims for the tortious death of a human being.'
These statutes give the personal representative such causes of action
on behalf of the decedent's estate as the decedent would have had
were he still alive. 2 The question the statutes do not answer, however,
is the effect of the death of a party on the measure of damages. The
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Warner v. McCaughan3 illustrates the problem.
Warner arose out of the death of a twenty-one year old college student. Alleging that the death was caused by improper diagnosis and
care and by administration of unsafe drugs, her parents, individually,

and her father, as administrator of her estate, brought suit for damages against the doctor, hospital, and pharmaceutical company on the
grounds of negligence and breach of warranty. The parents' individual
claims were dismissed because the parents were not dependents of the
decedent, 4 but the estate's claim was entertained. 5 One of the items of
* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 1964, J.D., 1966,
University of Iowa; B. Litt., 1968,,Oxford University.
1. See, e.g., Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239
(1929).
2. See, e.g., Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 923-24
(1957); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 99 (1961);
Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 838, 843.
3. 77 Wn.2d 178, 460 P.2d 272 (1969).
4. The parents' claim was brought under the wrongful death statute, WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.20.010-.020 (1959). This claim-wasdignmfsed because the parents were not dependents of the decedent. Warner, 77 Wn.2d at 185-86, 460 P.2d at 276-77. The right of
action created by the wrongful death statute is available only to beneficiaries in designated relationships with the decedent. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1956). In order for
parents to qualify for beneficiary status under the act, they must be dependent upon the
decedent for support. Id. See also Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935);
Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 145 Wash. 31, 258 P. 842 (1927).
5. This action was based upon the general survival statute. WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.046 (Supp. 1971).
No action was possible under the death-by-personal-injury survival statute. Such an
action is brought by the personal representative on behalf of statutory beneficiaries.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1959). In order to qualify as beneficiaries, parents must be
dependent upon the deceased. Id. See, e.g., Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wash. 234, 93 P.2d
376 (1939); Bortle v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 60 Wash. 552, 111 P. 788 (1910).
The fourth Washington tortious death statute, which creates a cause of action in par-
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damage claimed by the estate was "disability in consequence of a
medical condition" caused by the defendants' tortious acts and resulting in the decedent's death. 6 This claim presented the major issue
of the case: whether the prohibition in the general survival statute
against recovery for pain and suffering 7 prohibited recovery for the
decedent's "disability." The court rejected the defendants' argument
that the statutory prohibition meant that all claims personal to the
decedent abated with her death 8 and held that the statute allows "the
broad common-law claim for personal injury," except for pain and
suffering.9 The principal question remaining, which the Warner court
did not fully answer, is how these damages for physical injury are to
be measured in a tortious death case. The purpose of this article is to
discuss the factors relevant to the damages issue and to suggest appropriate standards for measuring them.
I.

INTRODUCTION-TORTIOUS DEATH ACTIONS
The focus of this article is on the "survival statute" action for re-

ents for injury to or death of a child, was not available because the decedent was over
twenty-one years old when she died and her parents were not dependent upon her. WASH.
REV. CODE 4.24.010 (Supp. 1971). Even if the decedent in Warner had been a minor,
the case was tried before the law was changed to permit recovery for loss of love and
companionship of the child and destruction of the parent-child relationship. Before the
law was amended in 1967, recovery under R.C.W. § 4.24.010 was limited to the actual
pecuniary loss to the parents, measured by the value of the child's services less the cost
of his support, from the date of injury until he would have reached his majority. Compare Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wn.2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943), with Lockhart v. Besel, 71
Wn.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967). Under that measure of damages, recovery for the loss
of a child attending college should in most cases be negligible. See generally 43 WASH.
L. REv. 654 (1968); 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 220 (1968).
6. Motions to dismiss the estate's claims for medical and hospital expenses and
burial and funeral expenses were denied. Warner, 77 Wn.2d at 181, 182, 460 P.2d at
274. While burial and funeral expenses are generally treated as expenses of the estate,
recovery has also been permitted under the wrongful death statute. See Comment,
Damages in Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH. L. REV. 441, 446-47
(1960). The plaintiff did not contest dismissal of the estate's claim for pain and suffering, since the survival statute explicitly excludes recovery for pain and suffering. WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (Supp. 1971).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (Supp. 1971).
8.
Warner, 77 Wn.2d at 184, 460 P.2d at 275. Under the defendants' suggested
reading of the proviso to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046(1) (Supp. 1971), damages for personal injuries, shortened life expectancy, and impaired earning capacity could not be
recovered. In effect, the defendants were arguing that the statute revived (or retained)
the distinction between claims which were personal and those involving property which
was so important in the rules regarding survival of claims at common law. See Jones v.
Matson, 4 Wn.2d 659, 667-72, 104 P.2d 591, 595-97 (1940); Malone, The Genesis of
Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV 1043, 1047-50 (1965).
9. Warner, 77 Wn.2d at 183, 460 P.2d at 275, quoting Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d
344, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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covery of damages in a tortious death. 10 At common law there were
two rules barring personal injury claims connected with the death of
the decedent: first, any action commenced by the decedent abated at
his death by virtue of the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, and, second, his personal representative was not permitted to
enforce any claims personal to the decedent after his death." Therefore, the decedent's estate was poorer by the amount of any uncompensated personal injury claims outstanding at his death. The survival
statutes authorize the decedent's personal representative to continue or
bring an action to recover for injuries incurred before the decedent's
death.' 2 The primary purpose behind the adoption of such statutes
seems to have been to permit the estate to recover for such items as
medical and hospital expenses.' 3 However, the survival statutes have
also been used in some jurisdictions to allow the dependents to re4
cover for their loss of support1
"Wrongful death" statutes provide another basis for recovering
compensation in tortious death situations. Also adopted to overturn
restrictive common law rules,' 5 these statutes give a cause of action to
10. For a recent discussion which focuses on the damages available under the Washington wrongful death statutes see Comment, Washington Wrongful Death and Survival
Actions, 6 GONZAGA L. REV. 314 (1971).
11. See Malone, supra note 8, at 1044-52. See also 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival and Revival, § I (1962).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.330 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-447
(1956); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (Supp. 1971).
13. See, e.g., Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So. 2d 213, 221-22 (1946); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806, 809 (1922). Until recently such a limited purpose seems to be the only one ascribed to the Washington survival statute by bench and bar. Although the latter had been construed in an assignability case to permit the survival of only claims surviving at common law, there was
never any reported case challenging that interpretation in a tortious death action. See
Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 P. 329 (1892). Even after the statute was
amended in 1961 to make clear that personal injury causes of action survive, the first
case in which damages for tortious death were sought under the statute was decided in
1969. See Warner, 77 Wn.2d 178, 460 P.2d 272 (1969). Apparently the survival action
has just not been considered a weapon in the practitioner's arsenal of tortious death
remedies. The most recent major treatise on tortious death omits the Washington survival statute from its catalogue of available remedies, except to mention that the state
has a survival statute. See S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 893-94, 995-96
(1966) [hereinafter cited as SPEISER].
14. See, e.g., Mallinger v. Brussow, 252 Iowa 54, 105 N.W.2d 626 (1960); Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436, 441-44, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
15. The classic statement of the common law position was made by Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808): "In a civil
Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury; and in this
case the damages, as to the plaintiff's wife, must stop with the period of her existence."
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designated beneficiaries for the injuries they have suffered by the tortious death of the decedent. 16 The principal differences between survival and wrongful death statutes are in the causes of action given
and the beneficiaries. In a survival action the estate (the creditors and
the heirs or devisees) succeeds to the claims which the decedent would
have possessed had he lived; in a wrongful death action the designated
beneficiaries, who are usually persons in certain familial relationships
with the decedent, 17 have a "new" cause of action for the damage done
18
them by the death.
Analytically, the most difficult problem of tortious death recoveries
is that the most substantial injuries have no readily ascertainable monetary values. 19 It is virtually impossible to affix a rational price tag on
the decedent's life and the loss to his family and friends of his love,
companionship, nurture, and all of the other qualities which make the
presence of an individual valuable to those around him. Thus, there is
continuous tension in tortious death cases between the desire to compensate for non-pecuniary injuries and the difficulty of doing so by
monetary awards. 20 This tension is most likely to be manifested in
wrongful death actions, where the designated beneficiaries are usually
16. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-810 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010.-.020 (1959).
17. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-908 (1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053
(1961); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1959). But see Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 663-3 (1968)
(spouse, children, parents, any person dependent upon the deceased).
18. Damages under wrongful death statutes are usually measured by either loss of
support or loss to the estate. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 95-102 (1935); SPEISER,
supra note 13, at §§ 3:1-3:2.
19. The seminal article is Jaffe, Damagesfor Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 221-28 (1953).
20. Recent developments regarding the Washington child death statute, WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.010 (1959), illustrate this problem. The statute had originally been construed in the same manner as the other wrongful death statutes to allow recovery for
the loss of support which the beneficiaries (parents) would have received from the
decedent (the child during his minority). See Upchurch v. Hubbard, 29 Wn.2d 559,
563, 188 P.2d 82, 85 (1947); Skeels v. Davidson, 18 Wn.2d 358, 366-67, 139 P.2d
301, 305 (1943); Skidmore v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 344, 244 P. 545, 547
(1926). The facts of modern life have meant that only rarely will a child make a
positive financial contribution to his parents; rather, he will virtually always be a net
economic loss. Therefore, there could usually be no recovery under the old statute
when a child died by tortious means, unless the court were hypocritically to relax the
burdens of proving the anticipated support from the child. See Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Everett, 232 F.2d 488, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1956) (Washington law); Kranzusch v.
Trustee Co., 93 Wash. 629, 633-34, 161 P. 492, 494-95 (1916). Recognizing that the
old measure was not suited to modern conditions, and that the injury suffered by the
parents in such cases is not limited to the pecuniary loss, the Washington Supreme

Court and the Washington Legislature came to the same conclusion, that the parents
should be entitled to recovery for the "loss of companionship" of the child. Lockhart
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the natural objects of both affection and intangible benefits from the
decedent, and presumptively are the persons who suffer the greatest
intangible losses by his death. 2 1 The survival action recovery, on the
other hand, goes to the decedent's creditors and heirs or devisees. The
relationship between these beneficiaries and the decedent is, by definition,
only one based on their succession to his property interests. For this
reason, the present discussion of damages under survival statutes is
largely freed from consideration of the complications involved in compensating non-pecuniary injuries.
The principal difficulty in measuring survival action damages lies in
giving full compensation for compensable injuries without permitting
excessive recoveries. 22 Full compensation requires both that the extent of injuries giving rise to causes of action be measured accurately
and that all parties suffering such injuries be identified. Excessive recoveries violate the principle that an ordinary tort recovery not be
punitive.23 A penalty is imposed on the tortfeasor to the extent that
overlapping remedies are permitted for the same injury or that damages are awarded for injuries not actually suffered. The discussion
which follows is intended to show how such precise compensation may
be accomplished under a survival statute.
II.

DAMAGES UNDER THE SURVIVAL STATUTE

Since a survival statute gives the personal repre~entative such causes
of action on behalf of the estate as the decedent would have had were
he still alive, 24 attention must first be given to what claims the decedent could have asserted as a living plaintiff. For present purposes,
these claims may be divided into two general categories: those for
v. Besel, 71 Wn.2d 112, 117, 426 P.2d 605, 609 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE §
4.24.010 (Supp. 1971). See 43 WASH. L. REv. 654 (1968); 3 GONZAGA L. REV. 220

(1968). Interestingly enough, while the Washington court has gone on to interpret
the amended child death statute as giving a cause of action for the parents' mental
anguish, see Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wn.2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971), the Michigan

Supreme Court has retreated from its position in the landmark case of Wycko v.
Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960) (allowing recovery for loss of
human companionship). Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d
836, 839-46 (1970). See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2922(2) (Supp. 1971).
21. See note 17, supra.
22. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 19, at 222-23.
23. See, e.g., Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 102
(1962); Pezzulli v. D'Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659, 661 (1942).
24. See notes 11-14, supra.
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damages already sustained at the time of trial and those for damages
which may reasonably be expected from the time of trial to the termination of the disability or the plaintiff's life expectancy. 25 The
primary claims in each class are usually for medical and hospital expenses, pain and suffering, and earnings lost because of the injury.
The difficulty with saying that a survival action gives the estate the
same claims that the decedent would have had if alive is that there is
an air of unreality in speaking of "prospective" losses of a decedent.
This difficulty should be apparent in the following discussion of the
major damage items available under survival statutes.
Medical and Hospital Expenses

A.

It is quite clear that the survival statute preserves to the estate any
claims of the decedent for medical and hospital expenses already incurred. 26 When the survival action is brought, the decedent is no
longer living, so he has no prospective medical or hospital expenses to
recover.
Painand Suffering

B.

The Washington general survival statute provides: "[N] o personal
representative shall be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased. ' 27 The proviso makes good sense regarding prospective pain and suffering. As with prospective medical expenses, the
decedent will never suffer the pain, so there is no actual damage to the
plaintiff. However, it may be argued that denying damages for pain
and suffering allows the tortfeasor to profit by his own wrong: if he
had not killed the decedent he would have been liable for prospective
pain and suffering, so he should not escape liability by inflicting the

25. On the problem of the proper life expectancy to use when it has been shortened
by the injury see Boberg, Damages Occasioned by Shortened (or Lengthened) Expectation of Life: A New Case and Some Further Thoughts, 79 S. AFR. L.J. 43 (1962); Duffey. Life Expectancy and Loss of EarningsCapacity, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 314 (1958); Fleming, The Lost Years: A Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages,50
CALIF. L. REV. 598 (1962); Comment, The Measure of Damagesfor a Shortened Life, 22
U. CI. L. REV. 505 (1955).

26.
27.
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Cf. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wn.2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961).
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (Supp. 1971).

Survival Actions
more grievous injury. The best answer to that argument is that the
policy of tort law is not to give retribution, but only to compensate for
28
actual losses incurred.
The case against recovery for pain and suffering sustained between
injury and death is not so clear. The decedent actually suffered and
felt the pain. Had the decedent recovered this item while he lived, as
he was entitled to do, his estate would have increased to the benefit of
his dependents, creditors, and heirs or devisees. The practical explanation for the limitation in the Washington survival statute is that it was
the price exacted by the insurance interests in the legislature for the
enactment of any survival statute.2 9 They apparently feared that allowance of pain and suffering damages would lead to excessive recoveries. 30 In any event, there is an element of economic cannibalism in
allowing a decedent's dependents, creditors, and heirs or devisees to
recover for the pain he suffered. 3 '
It is important to compare the treatment of pain and suffering
32
damages under the Washington death-by-personal-injury statute,
with that in the general survival statute just discussed. Both authorize
the survival of tort claims, but the death-by-personal-injury statute
does not exclude recovery for pain and suffering. The explanation for
28. See, e.g., Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323, 324
(1948).
Regarding the more general problem of death requiring less rather than greater compensation from the tortfeasor, we should be inured to the idea that it is still "more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him." W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS 902 (4th ed. 1971); Fleming, supra note 25, at 604-05. The continuing vitality of
that principle is illustrated by the limitation of tortious death damages to pecuniary
losses. Penoza v. Northern Pac. Ry., 215 F. 200 (W. D. Wash. 1914); Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 386, 391, 261 P.2d 692, 695 (1953); Woodbury v. Hoquiam Water Co., 138 Wash. 254, 244 P. 565 (1926). Also illustrative is the
restriction of wrongful death action recoveries to designated beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (1956), and the monetary limits on wrongful death recoveries in some jurisdictions. See also, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, §2 (Supp. 1971);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Supp. 1972).
Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.075 (1971).
29. See Richards, Washington Legislation--1961, Survival of Actions, 36 WASH. L.
REv. 331, 332 (1961).
30. This argument by the insurance interests assumes that they are treasuries, solely
responsible for the money to pay claims, rather than conduits for spreading losses
among their policy holders. See generally R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE 42-43
(1969); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight,70 YALE L. J. 554, 579-81 (1961); Peck, The Role of Courtsand Legislatures
in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265, 300-01 (1963).
31. Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 901 (4th ed. 1971); Richards, supra note 29, at
332. But cf. Oliver v. Ashman, [ 1962] 2 Q.B. 210, 224 (C.A. 1961).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1959).
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the anomaly is probably twofold. First, although the general survival
statute appears to cover all cases to which the death-by-personal-injury statute applies, the historical background of the former section
must be considered. 33 That statute was passed specifically to overcome
the very restrictive interpretation given to its predecessor. The predecessor statute had no exclusion for pain and suffering damages, 34 but
attachment of the proviso to the replacement was a political necessity
if an effective general survival statute was to be adopted. The question
now is why the death-by-personal-injury statute should be retained in
view of the fact that the broader general survival statute has been held
35
effective.
The probable answer to that question is also a second explanation
of the anomaly: the death-by-personal-injury statute, although in the
form of a survival statute, gives a cause of action only for beneficiaries
in designated relationships with the decedent, as does a wrongful
death statute. 36 This means that the statutory beneficiaries are allowed
to recover for such items as medical and hospital expenses and earnings lost until the date of death, free from the claims of the estate's
creditors and heirs or devisees.37 If the general survival statute were
the only remedy available, a statutory beneficiary dependent for support on the decedent's earnings might receive nothing if the estate
were insufficient to satisfy the claims of the creditors. 38 While this reasoning might explain the retention of the death-by-personal-injury
statute, it does not justify the allowance of pain and suffering damages.
Possibly, such damages are allowed as a little extra "compensation"
to the statutory beneficiaries because of a presumed insufficiency in
33. The original survival statute had provided that "[a]l 1 ... causes of action by
one person against another, whether arising on contract or otherwise, survive to the personal representatives of the former against the personal representatives of the latter."
Law of Dec. 2, 1869, Section 659, [1869] Wash. Terr. Laws 165. This apparently clear
language was construed in an 1892 assignability case to mean only that when actions
survived at common law the personal representative was the proper party to bring the
action. Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 P. 329 (1892).
34. See WAsH. CoDE § 718 (1881).
35. See Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wn.2d 178, 184, 460 P.2d 272, 276 (1969).
36. See notes 15-18, supra.
37. See Comment, Damages in Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 441 (1960).
38. The beneficiary would receive reimbursement for amounts advanced on behalf
of the decedent for medical and hospital expenses, since these expenses have first
priority (after funeral expenses) as claims against the estate. See WASH. REV. CODE §
11.76.110 (1965).
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the wrongful death recovery. The designated beneficiaries are the
same under both that statute and the wrongful death statute. 39 Thus,
permitting damages for the decedent's pain and suffering under the
former may allow the beneficiaries to receive more than the damages
for loss of support they would receive under the latter alone. There
are two objections to using the death-by-personal-injury statute to correct inadequate awards under the wrongful death statute.
First, calculating damages for pain and suffering is a highly speculative venture. 40 To add that enterprise to the calculation of pecuniary
measures for such intangibles as "loss of nurture,"'' 4 "loss of companionship," 42 and "loss of comforts and conveniences" 43 already permitted under the wrongful death act would seem to threaten the rational
basis for tortious death damages. Second, the character of pain and
suffering is distinguishable from the other elements recoverable under
the death-by-personal-injury statute. Items such as medical expenses
and lost earnings are by nature pecuniary. Under that statute, those
who directly suffer the pecuniary losses, either by reason of having
themselves paid the claims or having been deprived of the support, are
compensated for the injury to them. In contrast, pain and suffering is
an injury whose direct incidence is only on the deceased. Thus, a pecuniary award to the beneficiaries is not compensation for the injury
originally suffered. 4 4 At most, it may compensate the beneficiaries for
the loss of money expected to be in the estate if the decedent had lived
and had recovered for the pain and suffering he incurred. Once the
nature of the injury is seen in this light, it is apparent that no compelling reason exists why the statutory beneficiaries are more deserving of
compensation for this indirect injury than are the creditors and heirs
or devisees, who suffer the identical injury but are prohibited from
recovering for it under the general survival statute. In summary, while
the death-by-personal-injury statute might not have been rendered
superfluous by the adoption of the general survival statute, the reasons
39. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1959), with WASH. REV. CODE §
4.20.020 (1959).
40. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 318-19 (1935).
41. See, e.g., Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582,593, 50 P. 518, 522 (1897).
42. See, e.g., Davis v. North Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 583-84, 295 P. 921,
924 (1931).
43. See, e.g., Pearson v. Picht, 184 Wash. 607, 613, 52 P.2d 314, 316 (1935). See
generally Comment, Damages in Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH. L.
REV. 441, 443-46 (1960).
44. See text accompanying note 30, supra.
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for excluding recovery for pain and suffering are equally valid in the
former as in the latter. On the other hand, until the former statute is
amended, it is to the advantage of the decedent's relatives to qualify as
statutory beneficiaries so that they may recover pain and suffering
damages.
C.

Lost Earnings

Earnings lost by the decedent between injury and death present no
particular problem in a survival action. Had he lived he would have
been entitled to compensation for the reasonable value of the earnings
he lost because of the injury inflicted by the tortfeasor. Under the general survival statute that cause of action survives to his personal representative.
The claim for loss of prospective earnings presents the most significant issue in a cause of action under the survival statute. Since recovery for pain and suffering is excluded, loss of prospective earnings
is likely to be the major item of damage claimed. As the Warner court
noted: " 'Permanent loss of earning power is usually the chief economic harm caused by a permanent injury.' -45
Because the case arose on a motion to dismiss, the Warner court
did not discuss how this harm is to be measured. The only indication
of the measure of damages was in the quotation from Hudson v. Laz46

arus:

If Hudson in his lifetime had recovered judgment in this action, his
damages would have included an allowance for prospective loss of
earnings during his normal life expectancy, discounted to present
worth, and with such other adjustments as the facts may require.
Since the court clearly authorized the recovery of some prospective
earnings, 47 the pertinent question is: what are the "adjustments as the
facts may require" from the present value of lost prospective earnings? 4 8
45. 77 Wn.2d at 183, 460 P.2d at 275, quoting Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344,
348 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
46.

Id.

47. 77 Wn.2d at 183-84, 460 P.2d at 275-76.
48. Since the net accumulations measure gives a present recovery of what would
otherwise be a single payment in the future, present value should be computed by the
straight, rather than the annuity, method. The annuity method is appropriate when the
recovery represents periodic future payments. See Note, Wrongful Death Actions in
Iowa, 48 IowA L. REV. 666, 672 (1963).
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A proper analysis of that question requires consideration of the interests of a number of different persons. The interest of the tortfeasor
is in not paying damages in excess of actual losses, since the policy of
tort law is compensatory and not punitive. The decedent, of course,
no longer has any interest which must be served in the survival action.4 9
There are three other interested groups, however: the decedent's
dependents, his creditors, and his heirs or devisees. 50The dependents
expected to be supported by the decedent. Because of his death alternative arrangements must be made for their support. Similarly, creditors may have extended credit to the decedent on the basis of his expected earnings. 51 His death deprives them of that security. Finally,
the heirs or devisees have an obvious interest in the savings and accumulations in the decedent's estate.
The interests of the heirs or devisees are perhaps less worthy of
consideration than those of the others with claims to the decedent's
property, since the injury which they incur because of the tortfeasor's
act is somewhat speculative.5 2 First, the value of the estate may be
subject to more fluctuation in the future than even the decendent's
prospective earnings, because of changes in such factors as the
number of dependents, the return on investments, and the decedent's
spending patterns. Second, the identity of the heirs or devisees may
well change, and it is only fortuitous that particular persons hold that
status at the time of the decedent's death. Nevertheless, a consideration of their interests is necessary since the heirs and devisees suffer
injury if they are unable to recover what they would have received if
the decedent had died naturally.
With the interests of these parties in mind, the following discussion
considers some alternative measures of damages for lost prospective
earnings. These measures generally fall into three categories. First,
some courts base the award on the full amount of the decedent's lost
prospective earnings with no adjustments other than a reduction to
49. See Duffey, The Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIO ST.
LJ. 264, 266 (1958). But see Fleming, supra note 25, at 605.

50.

See Murray v. Omaha Transfer Co., 98 Neb. 482, 153 N.W. 488,489 (1915). Cf.

Duffey, supra note 49, at 266; Jaffe, supra note 19, at 227. But see J. MUNKMAN,
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND DEATH 141-42 (3d ed. 1966).
51. See Duffey, supra note 49, at 266; Comment, Damages in Washington Wrongful
Death Actions, 35 WASH. L. REV. 441 n.7 (1960). But cf. 44 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1931),

which appears to consider the creditors' interest only in relation to earnings lost before
death.
52. Cf. Duffey, supra note 49, at 266.
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present value. 53 This will be termed the "gross earnings" measure. Second, many courts make the award according to the value of the decedent's prospective earnings reduced by his expected expenditures for
his own maintenance. 54 This is the "net earnings" measure. Finally,
there are courts which measure the survival action recovery by the
amount of the lost prospective earnings which the decedent would
have been expected to save and accumulate; that is, the amount which
could be expected to be in his estate when he died at the end of his
normal life expectancy. 55 This "net accumulations" measure of damages differs from the "net earnings" measure in that all of the decedent's expenditures are taken into account, not just those for his own
maintenance.
1.

"Gross Earnings" Measure

The "gross earnings" measure of damages was that allowed in
Hudson v. Lazarus when the court made no adjustments to the present
value of the prospective earnings during the decedent's normal life
expectancy. 56 Thus, the recovery for prospective earnings was exactly
the same as if the decedent had brought the action during his lifetime.
The difficulty with this measure is that it overcompensates the estate.
When the plaintiff recovers prospective earnings during his lifetime, it
is expected that part of that recovery will go to his maintenance
during his life expectancy. When the injured party is dead, he has no
further expenses of maintenance, so that part of the prospective earnings recovery will be a windfall to those who share in the estate.5 7 The
only argument in favor of this measure, that the tortfeasor should not
profit by his own wrong,5 8 is not persuasive in light of the non53. See Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1967);
Hudson v. Cole, 102 Ga. App. 300, 115 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1960).
54. See, e.g., Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc. 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 926 (1957);
Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 103-04 (1961); Ferne v.
Chadderton, 363 Pa. 191, 69 A.2d 104, 108 (1949).
55. See, e.g., Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. App. 1963); Mallinger v.
Brussow, 252 Iowa 54, 105 N.W.2d 626 (1960). Cf. Cann v. Mann Const. Co., 47 Del.
504, 93 A.2d 741, 743 (1952).
56. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
57. See Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 926-27 (1957);
Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 103-04 (1961); Murray v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323, 325 (1948); Comment, The Measure
of Damagesfor a Shortened Life, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 505, 511 (1955).
58. See Murray v. Philadelphia Transp. Co. 359 Pa. 69, 58 A.2d 323, 329-30 (1948)
(dissenting opinion).
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punitive policy of tort law to compensate only for losses actually
incurred.
2.

"Net Earnings"versus "Net Accumulations"

The question of the proper measure as between the net earnings
and net accumulations theories must be considered in the context of
the tortious death statutes applicable. A multiplicity of applicable statutes may have the undesirable effect of allowing double recovery and
penalizing the tortfeasor. Therefore, this section considers the question when the jurisdiction has only a survival statute, when there are
both survival and wrongful death statutes, and when there are both
types of statutes but only the survival statute applies.
The net earnings measure (gross earnings less personal maintenance
expenses) can be used to compensate all the interested parties in a survival action. The dependents, assuming that they share in the estate,
can recover for the support they would have received during the decedent's normal life expectancy.5 9 The creditors are protected by the
availability of proceeds from the future earning capacity on which
they relied when extending credit to the decedent. 60 Finally, the heirs
or devisees receive the surplus of the estate which they could have
expected had the decedent lived to his normal life expectancy.
However, since the net earnings measure is based on the decedent's
expected gross earnings less only the expected bxpense of his maintenance, there is a possibility that the tortfeasor will be charged with
losses other than those actually incurred. This will arise because there
is no reduction under this measure for amounts that the decedent
might have spent on himself other than for his own maintenance; that
59. Dependents may share in the decedents estate by virtue of testamentary provisions, intestate succession, or dower or community property rights. However, not every

dependent qualifies under one of these ways to participate in the distribution. Furthermore, there is no necessary relationship between the respective shares of qualified recipients and their dependency. The temptation must be firmly fiesisted to tinker with the

survival action measure of damages in order that the legislative judgment about succession to the decedent's property might conform more closely with the actual pattern of
expected support.
60. Creditors may be prejudiced if the amount protected from garnishment is less
than the actual cost of maintaining the decedent during his lifetime. For example, if 75
percent of the decedent's earnings were protected from garnishment, but he ordinarily
spent 80 percent of his earnings on his own maintenance, the creditors would have 25

percent of the earnings available for their security during his lifetime, but they will receive only 20 percent as a result of the tortfeasor's act.

621

Washington Law Review

Vol. 47: 609, 1972

is, there is no reduction for amounts the decedent would have spent
for his own enjoyment. 6 1 Probably no adjustment is made for this second
category of personal expenses on the reasoning that the law does not
concern itself with how the plaintiff spends his money. 62 Such an argument, which may be appropriate when making a lump-sum payment
to a living plaintiff, 63 loses its force when applied in a survival action.
When the estate is seeking the recovery, it is clear that the injured party
(the decedent) will not make expenditures for his own enjoyment, so
the proper concern of the law should be to insure that the tortfeasor is
charged only for the losses which are incurred by those who recover:
the dependents, creditors, and heirs or devisees.6 4 Thus, in states in
which there is only a survival statute, "net earnings" is the proper
measure of damages only if it is redefined to equal gross expected earnings less expected expenses for both personal maintenance and personal enjoyment. This measure is equivalent to net accumulations plus
expenses that would have been made for the support of dependents.
Although the properly computed net earnings measure will compensate all the interested persons without charging the tortfeasor for
improper items, a significant problem arises if this measure is used
where a wrongful death statute is also applicable. Under the Washington wrongful death statute, 65 as in many jurisdictions, 66 the recovery to the statutory beneficiaries is measured by the loss which
they incurred by the decedent's death. 67 This generally means that the
tortfeasor is liable to them for that portion of the decedent's prospective earnings which would have been contributed to the beneficiaries'
support. Therefore, where the survival statute damages are measured
by net earnings and the beneficiaries are entitled to recovery for their
loss under the wrongful death act, there will be double recovery of
prospective earnings to the extent that the beneficiaries are the same
under the two statutes.6 8 For example, if the parents of the decedent
in Warner had been dependent upon her, they would have been enti61.
62.
(1904):
63.
64.
65.

See Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918, 927 (1957).
Cf. Olivier v. Houghton County St. Ry. Co., 138 Mich. 242, 101 N.W. 530, 531
Oliver v. Ashman, [19621 2 Q.B. 210, 224 (C.A. 1961).
SeeWisev. Kaye, [1962] 1 Q.B. 638, 658 (C.A. 1961).
See Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 106 (1961).
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.40.010-.020 (1959).

66.

See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 98 (1935).

67.

See Comment, Damages in Washington Wrongful Death Actions, 35 WASH. L.

REv. 441, 443-47 (1960).

68.
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See Duffey, supra note 49, at 268.
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tled to recover under the wrongful death act the amount of expected
support and under the survival act the amount of all prospective earnings available to them from the estate through the laws of descent and
distribution.
The conclusion to be drawn when both the wrongful death and survival statutes apply is that the maximum recovery for lost prospective
earnings in a survival action should be measured by the net accumulations theory. This measure compensates all those with actual losses:
the statutory dependents receive their expected support under the
wrongful death statute, 69 and the creditors and heirs or devisees participate in the prospective earnings to the extent such earnings would
70
have been accumulated in the decedent's estate in a normal lifetime.
In addition, the tortfeasor does not have to pay twice or for any losses
not actually incurred.
England and several United States jurisdictions with both wrongful
death and survival statutes have adopted another means of dealing
with the allocation of damages in actions for tortious death. They
limit the recovery under the survival statute to losses incurred before
death: medical expenses, actual pain and suffering, and earnings lost
between injury and death.7 1 The wrongful death action compensates
only the statutory beneficiaries for the injuries they incur by the death.
Under this allocation there can be no recovery for prospective earnings, except to the extent they would go to the support of the statutory
72
beneficiaries.
The usual justification for the division between pre-death and
post-death actions is based on an inference of legislative intention.
69. Of course, dependents who qualify as beneficiaries under neither type of statute
do in fact incur injury without compensation. However, that is primarily a result of the
legislative judgment that the class of beneficiaries under the wrongful death act should
be restricted, instead of including all dependents in it. As for dependents who are heirs
or devisees but not wrongful-death beneficiaries, it is difficult to adjust the survival
statute mechanism in order to assure that they are fully compensated. Even if the recovery were increased to include their anticipated support, distribution of the estate is
governed by probate law which takes no account of dependency.
70. See Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F.2d 102, 104-05 (3d Cir. 1940); Rohlfing v. Moses
Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 373, 369 P.2d 96, 103-04 (1961); Ferne v. Chadderton, 363 Pa.
191, 69 A.2d 104, 108 (1949). See also Note, Damagesfor Wrongful Death in Pennsylvania, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 68, 73-74 (1942). Cf.Comment, The Measure of Damagesfor a
Shortened Life, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 512-13 (1955).
71. See, e.g., Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline
Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922); Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 39
N.E.2d 153 (1942). See also J. MAYNE & H. McGREGOR, DAMAGES 321-22, 682 (12th ed.

1961).
72.

See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 906-07 (4th ed. 1971).
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The argument made is that no wrongful death statute would have
been adopted if the same damages were already available under the
prior survival statute.7 3 Thus, the only purpose of the survival statute
is to change the common law rule abating personal injury causes of
action at death. The measure of damages for the revived cause of action is the same as the personal representative could recover if the
decedent had died at the same time but of natural causes: expenses
and losses to the date of death. 4 The major difficulty with this approach is that granting a wrongful death remedy does not necessarily
mean that damages for all prospective losses will be exhausted by it.
To the extent that prospective losses exceed contributions to the statutory dependents, there is an opportunity for concurrent remedies
without any punitive duplication of damages. 75 Therefore, the adoption of a wrongful death statute does not necessarily imply an intention to cut off all prospective losses in the survival action. Furthermore, such an idea is inconsistent with the notion that "all" personal
injury causes of action survive, that the statute preserves the decedent's causes of action as if he were alive, since one of his inter vivos
causes of action was for loss of prospective earnings during his
pre-injury life expectancy.
A second justification of the time-of-death theory rests on the rule
that the survival statute preserves only the causes of action possessed
by the decedent. During his lifetime he had a cause of action for his
loss of earnings to the date of his death; since that death has now occurred, his loss of earnings has been completely measured.76 It is true
that the estate can recover for lost earnings only to the date of death if
the injured party dies from causes unrelated to the injury during the
pendency of the action. 77 However, it does not necessarily follow that
death should terminate the period of recoverable lost earnings when it
is caused by the injury. In fact, the contrary is suggested by the Amer73. See, e.g., Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1940) (Maine law);
Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1955); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co.,
108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806, 808-09 (1922).
74. See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 847-48 (Fla. 1955).
75. See text accompanying notes 59-60, supra.
76. Allen v. Burdette, 139 Ohio St. 208, 39 N.E.2d 153 (1942). See Hindmarsh v.
Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806, 808 (1922).
77. See Dark v. Brinkman, 136 So. 2d 463, 469-70 (La. App. 1962) (award not to be
reduced unless death before trial); Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 336 Mo. 497, 79 S.W.2d 109,
114 (1934); Chappell v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co., 402 Pa. 646, 168 A.2d 330, 332
(1961).
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ican rule that when the plaintiff's life expectancy is shortened as a result of the injury he is entitled to recover for prospective earnings for
78
the entire period of his pre-injury life expectancy.
A third argument in favor of limiting survival actions to pre-death
damages is that the legislature has not seen fit to allow recovery for
injuries caused by the death except as incurred by the statutory beneficiaries. Since creditors and heirs or devisees are not statutory beneficiaries, it is argued that they are not entitled to compensation for the
injuries to their interests caused by the death.7 9 The response to this
argument should be that their injury, the loss of expected future earnings, occurred at the moment the decedent was permanently disabled.
80
That moment may be said always to precede the moment of death.
Therefore, the injury to them was included in the decedent's cause of
action while he lived, so under the survival statute the claims based on
it should not abate at his death.
A final justification for the date of death rule is that it is easy to
administer. This virtue does not overcome the fact that the rule operates to the prejudice of the estate's creditors and heirs or devisees.
Since there are other means by which these persons can be compensated without double recovery, a jurisdiction with both types of statutes should adopt the net accumulations measure of damages in sur8
vival actions rather than limit survival damages to pre-death losses. '
The situation typically arises in cases in which there are no statutory
beneficiaries, where the test of dependency is not'met by the beneficiaries, or where the dependents are not within the proper relationship.8 2
The choice then faced by the court is between the net earnings
measure (as redefined), appropriate when there is a survival statute
alone, and the net accumulations measure, appropriate when the
wrongful death and survival statutes together provide the remedies for
tortious death.
78. See, e.g., Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, 685,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13
N.W.2d 627, 632 (1944). See also Comment, The Measure of Damagesfor a Shortened
Life, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 509-10 (1955). But see Borough v. Minneapolis & St. L.
Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 1216, 184 N.W. 320, 323-24 (1921).

79.

Cf.Comment, The Measureof Damagesfor a Shortened Life, 22 U. Cm. L. REV.

505, 513 n.34 (1955).

80.

See Clark v. Manchester, 64 N.H. 471, 13 A. 867, 869 (1888).

81.

Duffey, supra note 49, at 268-70.

82. See, e.g., Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wn.2d 178, 186, 460 P.2d 272, 276-77
(1969) (parents not dependent). Cf. Weyerhauser Timber Co., v. Marshall, 102 F.2d 78,
79 (9th Cir. 1939). See generally Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1235 (1960).
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Hudson v. Lazarus,83 relied upon in Warner, illustrates one treatment of this issue. There the injured party instituted an action during
his lifetime against the tortfeasor. When he died as a result of his injuries approximately twenty-three months after the accident, his wife, as
administratrix, was substituted as plaintiff in his personal injury action. Nineteen months thereafter she also brought an action for
wrongful death in her own behalf. The wrongful death action was
dismissed because it was not brought within the one-year statute of
limitations. 84 Thus, the issue presented was the measure of damages in
the survival action alone. The court held there was no possibility of
double recovery since the wrongful death statute did not apply, so
there was no need to reduce the allowance for prospective loss of
earnings during the decedent's normal life expectancy by the amount
the wife could have recovered as lost support under the wrongful
85
death statute.
Under the Hudson decision, the dependents can recover prospective
earnings even though the legislature has said through the statute of
limitations on wrongful death actions that the dependents can recover
for the death only if they bring the action within one year. Although
the court denied it, they used the survival statute to create a cause of
action for the dependents, since the opinion is clear that this item
could not be recovered in a survival action if a wrongful death action
were possible. 86 The important question for present purposes is
whether such an end-run around the legislative intent would be
equally appropriate in situations like Warner. The better view would
seem to be that the Warner and Hudson situations are distinguishable
and that only the net accumulations measure of prospective earnings
should be applied in survival actions such as Warner.
The principal distinguishing factor between Hudson and Warner is
the reason the plaintiffs were disqualified from bringing the wrongful
death action. In Hudson the wrongful death action was barred because her claim was not instituted promptly. The usual reason for not
permitting the prosecution of stale claims is to prevent unfairness to
opponents which may arise if they are required to defend after memories have faded and witnesses have disappeared. 87 However, the plain83.
84.

217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Id. at 345.

85.
86.

Id. at 348-49.
Id.

87

See, e.g., Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); Pearson v.
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tiff had joined her wrongful death claim with a personal injury action
which had been commenced promptly. 88 There was no possibility of
unfairness to the defendants because both actions rested on the same
facts and required the same evidence.8 9 Any unfairness in the situation
would arise only if the widow were deprived of her support because of
an essentially procedural matter.
On the other hand, in Warner, the rule disqualifying the parents
from bringing the wrongful death action goes to the essence of the
remedy. The legislative judgment expressed by the statute is that only
parents who are dependent on their adult child may recover for his
tortious death, no matter how deserving they might otherwise be. For
the court to adjust the survival action measure of recovery so that the
parents could recover more than they would ordinarily expect as heirs
or devisees would subvert this legislative pronouncement. In general,
if plaintiffs do not come within the wrongful death statute categories,
their recovery should be limited to that part of the prospective earnings they would receive as heirs or devisees in the event that qualifying
beneficiaries did bring a wrongful death action: their share in the estate the decedent could reasonably be expected to accumulate during
his normal life expectancy.
This conclusion assumes that the only purpose of the survival
statute (except insofar as it prevents the abatement of claims actually
accruing before death) is to protect the creditors and heirs or devisees
from being prejudiced by the acceleration of the decedent's death. The
dependents, as designated by the legislature, are protected by the
wrongful death statute. However, even if the survival action is seen as
another way of protecting dependents, it is subject to a severe practical limitation. In order for dependents who are not qualified as beneficiaries under the wrongful death act (or the widow in Hudson) to be
protected by the survival statute, they must be heirs or devisees of the
estate. Furthermore, if the will or the law of intestate succession does
not divide the estate in such a manner that the dependent receives the
support he would have expected from the decedent, the survival
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912

(1963).
88.

Hudson, 217 F.2d at 345.

89.

The only difference would be in the proof of damages, since the wrongful death

recovery is based on the injury to the dependents and the survival recovery on the injury
to the estate. This is unlikely to be of much importance: the proof of the decedent's earnings, maintenance, and contributions is likely to be made by the same witnesses, even
though various elements thereof are relevant only to one recovery or the other.
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statute has not served this other purpose. Thus, applying a net earnings measure of prospective earnings (which takes into account contributions made to others) is only a very imprecise, and frequently useless, tool for protecting dependents not covered by the wrongful death
act.
CONCLUSION
Warner v. McCaughan made it clear, at last, that the legislative
mandate in the general survival statute means exactly what it says. All
tort causes of action, except claims for pain and suffering, survive the
death of the injured party. The primary purpose of this article has
been to examine the major element of damages recoverable under that
statute, prospective earnings. Alternative measures of lost prospective
earnings have been suggested, with the conclusion that, considering
the interests of the dependents, creditors, heirs or devisees, and the
tortfeasor, and taking into account the legislative judgments expressed
in the statutory schemes for tortious death actions, recovery of prospective earnings in a survival action should be on the basis of the net
accumulations measure in states such as Washington which have both
survival statutes and wrongful death statutes, regardless of whether
the latter applies. In jurisdictions having only survival statutes, the net
earnings measure, redefined to exclude expenditures by the decedent
for both his own maintenance and enjoyment, is appropriate.
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